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It is widely acknowledged that the creation in 1982 of the Central Appellate Court for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC), a centralized patent court in the US that lacks an EU equivalent,
strengthened intellectual property (IP) rights. As a consequence, ﬁrms became to rely
more heavily on patents as a means to protect their IP, a shift from prior practice that
has lead to an upsurge in patenting and has contributed to the creation of large patent
portfolios by dominant US ﬁrms. Proponents of this change view stronger IP rights as
having provided a fertile ground on which US technological superiority has spawned,
contrary to the situation in the EU. Critics, on the other hand, acknowledge a drop in
patent quality and frequent overlapping patents that have considerably increased costly
patent litigation both in time and money. In addressing these concerns policy makers have
introduced the Patent Reform Act of 2007, whose main role is to reduce patent litigation.
Following this trend economists recognized the need to reassess the rationale for
patents given that new innovations increasingly tend to be cumulative/sequential, building
upon previously-patented prior art. In such environments, due to the inevitable conﬂict
in providing incentives to current and future innovators, the dynamic eﬀects of patent sys-
tems can be fundamentally diﬀerent from the conventional wisdom, as forcefully argued
recently by Bessen and Maskin (2007) in a dynamic game between rival innovators, and by
Hopenhayn et al. (2006) from the social planner’s optimal patent design perspective. The
current paper contributes to this debate by furthering our understanding of the impact
of diﬀerent levels of IP protection on the long-run innovation dynamics of startup ﬁrms.
This shift in focus from established patentees to startup innovators is in recognition of
the extent to which the latter’s innovativeness has shaped modern hi-tech industries, and
of their frequent inability to defend their IP rights against dominant rivals (owing to the
considerable legal fees and the uncertainty surrounding patent litigation).
In the US where startups are most active, since the foundation of CAFC there has
been a steady increase of takeover activities (even after discounting the surge of such
activities shortly before 2001, that is attributable to the internet bubble) as shown in
Figures 1-2, where established ﬁrms ventured to acquire smaller ones. True as it may
be that the reasons behind such takeovers are diverse, many were driven by the desire
to expand a ﬁrm’s technological horizons via the purchase of innovative startup ﬁrms.1
1Restricting the argument to a few prominent examples, in the 1984 to 2001 period G.E. and Siemens
acquired more than 110 and 170 ﬁrms respectively; see Dessyllas and Hughes (2005).
1This drive, coined by H. Chesbrough as open innovation, gained prominence among ﬁrms
such as Intel and Cisco; see Chesbrough (2003). The prospects of such takeovers serve
as a secondary market for ideas, in addition to the NASDAQ, oﬀering entrepreneurial
entrants an extra option for reaping the beneﬁts of their inventions. This co-evolution
of the court’s attitude and takeover activities is consistent with the intuition behind this
paper.
Operating under the constant threat of infringement allegations from an incumbent
ﬁrm, a startup’s innovation incentive is inﬂuenced by the level of IP protection that the
legal system would provide, in the form of upholding the incumbent’s patent infringement
allegation against the startup. Along these lines, in a model where an incumbent faces
a sequence of potential startups and the incumbent’s chance of winning an infringement
lawsuit increases with the size of its patent portfolio, we show that takeover deals (out of
court settlements) generate extra beneﬁts for the incumbent via its enhanced bargaining
positions in future settlement deals, and a part of such extra beneﬁts accrues to the
current startup as an increased bargaining share. This increased bargaining share may
actually be large enough to justify the startup’s innovation activity that would not have
taken place otherwise. This eﬀect may be greatest under moderate levels of IP protection,
because the increase in the bargaining share, being proportional to the marginal beneﬁts
brought by the last patent added to the portfolio, would be too small if the protection
was too weak while it would taper oﬀ too quickly if the protection was excessive.
In particular, in hi-tech industries where technology is complex and cumulative, a new
innovation is likely to infringe on existing patents. Therefore, an entrant ﬁrm is likely to
face the threat of litigation from a competing incumbent patent holder of a signiﬁcantly
larger size. Commentators argue that when IP protection is limited, and the courts
have lenient views regarding alleged infringement, an entrant will abstain from innovating
because its innovation will not be adequately protected from the incumbent. However,
the ﬂip side of this logic also suggests that if IP protection is strong, and the courts take a
tough stance on alleged infringement, the fear of a diﬃcult litigation battle would equally
diminish the entrant’s incentives to innovate.
Implicit in the argument above appears to be a presumption we adopt, namely, that
an incumbent ﬁrm has accumulated a patent portfolio on a set of technologies that are
interrelated and advance on a common theme (having a central idea as a backbone) and
hence, form a uniﬁed technological territory. Although in reality large ﬁrms’ patent port-
folios tend to range across many and frequently diverging technologies, for the purpose
2of this paper a patent portfolio means a subset of a ﬁrm’s patents that are on a speciﬁc
technological terrain.2 Thus, the larger is a ﬁrm’s patent portfolio, the better described,
entrenched, and protected becomes its technological territory, enhancing the ﬁrm’s ability
to prevail in court over infringement disputes concerning newer ideas that are perceived as
having built upon the same technological terrain. This association between patent port-
folios and the ability to protect an individual patent is supported by empirical ﬁndings,
e.g., Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) explained in Section 2.
As will be shown later, if IP protection is moderate, allowing the courts a balanced
approach towards alleged infringement, the beneﬁt of a takeover for the incumbent goes
beyond commercializing the new innovation. This is because the incumbent capitalizes on
the enhanced bargaining position that the current takeover will bring in all potential future
deals by incorporating the current startup’s patented ideas to its own patent portfolio,
which allows it to better barricade its technological territory. Since this prospect of future
surplus for the incumbent hinges on the current takeover, a part of the surplus accrues to
the current startup, enlarging its bargaining share. We show that this dynamic eﬀect of
moderate IP protection can motivate the startups’ innovation activities that would not
take place without it, and as a consequence, increase the social welfare. We emphasize,
however, that for maximum eﬀect the level of IP protection should be selected carefully
because excessive IP protection would accumulate the incumbent’s bargaining power too
quickly, killing oﬀ the innovation incentives for startups prematurely.
The existing literature on cumulative innovations includes Scotchmer (1996), Green
and Scotchmer (1995), and Chang (1995), that focus on a single follow-on innovation; and
O’Donoghue, et al. (1998), Hopenhayn, et al. (2006), and Bessen and Maskin (2007), on
multiple sequential innovations. The main feature that diﬀerentiates our paper is that
we explicitly model the uncertain nature of court rulings in infringement suits, based
on how dissimilar ﬁrms (incumbents vs. startups), having amassed patent portfolios to
indiﬀerent depths, defend their IP rights. Our approach shares some key features of,
and is complementary to, Bessen and Maskin (2007) who examine the dynamic inter-
action between equally dominant ﬁrms, with an important distinction that we do not
2Chemical ﬁrms frequently form such portfolios. For example, upon the invention of NYLON Du-
Pond patented all the chemical formulae bearing resemblance to its core technology. More recently, with
regard to the wireless market contended by tech giants such as Apple Inc., Forbes wrote “The end game:
futuristic gizmos controlled by gestures that are tied wirelessly to the world around them, protected by a
broad portfolio of patents, ···” (emphasis added); see http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/30/apple-iphone-
3g-tech-wire-cx_bc_0501apple.html?partner=yahootix.
3have “complementarities” between innovation eﬀorts that appear to be essential in their
analysis.
Deﬁning boundaries of intellectual properties is inherently imperfect and as a result,
disputes are inevitable and the court plays an active role in the way the patent system
operates.3 The eﬀects of patent litigation have been studied by Meurer (1989), Choi
(1998), Aoki and Hu (1999), Crampes and Langinier (2002), and Llobet (2003), however
these authors mostly dealt with a single patent to protect and thus, their foci of analysis
diﬀer from ours: In a model where the incumbent’s patent portfolio can evolve over time,
we examine the feedback eﬀect that the prospect of such evolution may have on the
startup’s innovation incentives, and discuss the long-run welfare implications thereof.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of the patent system that
provides some background for our analysis. Section 3 presents a static model as a bench-
mark. Section 4 provides the main analysis of the dynamic model and characterizes the
unique equilibrium. Section 5 discusses some implications of our ﬁndings using simula-
tions. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 A closer look at the patent system
Patents are monopoly-grants that hold for a time period of 20 years. During this period no
one, apart from the patent holder, may freely make use of the technology embodied in the
patent’s claims. Nevertheless, occasionally new ideas arrive, whose technological domain
may well rest in a technological territory vaguely entrenched by the patent’s claims, in
which case the issue of possible infringement arises, frequently accompanied by a counter
claim of validity. This infringement diﬀers from a direct copying and re-branding of one’s
patented ideas, in as much as it progresses the prior art. The question of how and by how
much the novel idea progresses prior art ﬁnds no equivalent in other forms of material-
property. This is because, asserting property rights on one’s ideas is far from simple. An
idea, contrasting land, can never be fully barricaded or entrenched. Therefore, the issue
of infringement is largely a subjective one, resting on the decision of courts and it is up to
the innovator, through litigation, to prove the merits of her innovation. In other words,
patents convey imperfect property rights to technologies, rights that can only be asserted
3“According to U.S. patent law, the issuance of a patent does no more than confer a patent right that
is “presumed” valid (35 U.S.C.A. Sec. 282) in that the ﬁnal responsibility for validating or invalidating
the patent resides with the courts.” (Choi, 1998, p.1249).
4by courts. It has thus been argued that patents can be thought of as lotteries that carry
some probability of being veriﬁed by a court; see Lemley and Shapiro (2005).
Two factors indisputably aﬀect the enforcement probability of a patent. The ﬁrst one
is the scope (or breadth) of the patent, describing, through the claims that the patent
oﬃce allows the patent holder to include, the patent’s technological territory. The more
extensive the claims are the more powerful a patent is, for it is harder to bypass it (e.g., by
innovating around it) in developing a better and more advanced technology. Nonetheless,
the claims of the patent themselves lack the ability to self-enforce. The power to enforce
is vested in courts, which are the ultimate judges of the patents’ merits. Therefore, the
courts’ attitude towards infringement is also a key determinant of patent validity.
The above factors are far from static. As far as the US is concerned, we have seen
a drastic change in the past 20 years, both in court attitudes and patent scope. The
catalyst for these changes was the Federal Courts Improvements Act that allowed for the
formation of the CAFC. The CAFC raised the evidentiary standards required to challenge
patent validity and broadened the interpretation of patent scope. In doing so the CAFC
tilted the table towards patents making it easier to assert infringement. The data is
revealing. Koenig (1980) provided validity and infringement data for district and circuit
courts litigated patents during the years 1953-1978. He found that courts upheld the
validity of patents in about 35% of the cases in which validity was an issue. This pattern
was to drastically change with the introduction of the CAFC. Speciﬁcally, Harmon (1991)
ﬁnds that from 1982 to 1990, the CAFC aﬃrmed 90% of district court decisions holding
patents to be valid and infringed, and reversed 28% of the judgments of invalidity and
non-infringement. As a result, the overall probability that a litigated patent will be held
to be valid has risen to 54%; see Allison and Lemley (1998).
This pro-patent stance is not cost-free. Merges (1999) points out that the expenses of
a patent infringement court case can range from $1 million to several millions, although
Farrell and Merges (2004) show that as more money is at risk in the suit, litigation costs
rise sharply. Taking a closer look at the total cost of patent litigation, Lerner (1994)
reports that, from July 1989 to June 1990, 1318 patent related suits were initiated in
the US Federal Court and approximately 3900 procedures within the US Patents and
Trademarks Oﬃce (PTO). He estimates, based on historical costs, that these cases will
involve legal expenditures of about one billion 1991 dollars, which should be compared
with expenditure on basic research of 3.7 billion by US ﬁrms in 1991.
It appears that litigation is an easier and less costly path to follow for ﬁrms with large
5patent portfolios. For example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) ﬁnd that having a
larger portfolio of patents reduces the probability of ﬁling a suit on any individual patent
in the portfolio. As they note, “for a (small) domestic unlisted company with a small
portfolio of 100 patents, the average probability of litigating a given patent is 2%. For
a company with a similar proﬁle but with a moderate portfolio of 500 patents the ﬁgure
drops to 0.5%. Thus, it is easier (less costly) to protect any given patent when that patent
is part of a larger portfolio of patents”. Furthermore, as they indicate, large ﬁrms (with
large patent portfolios) have the experience and the ability to settle disputes by pooling
or trading intellectual property. Therefore, if imperfect capital markets limit the capacity
of smaller ﬁrms to ﬁnance litigation, larger ﬁrms may be able to extract better terms
because they pose more credible litigation threats in confronting smaller ﬁrms.
On the other side of the Atlantic, even though the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO)
grants patents using largely similar requirements to the PTO, it is stricter in granting a
patent4 and it allows, through a post grant opposition mechanism, any interested party
to challenge a patent at the EPO up until 9 months after the patent is granted. In fact,
8.2% of all EPO patents are challenged, and about one third are revoked; see Harhoﬀ
and Reitzig (2004). This procedure does not undermine the power of the member states’
courts, and if an opposing party, having lost its EPO opposition, wants to pursue its
case at a national level it is free to do so, at a cost of anything between 50,000€ and
500,000€, depending on the country and the complexity of the case; see Ropski (1995).
These diﬀerences limit the scope of EPO patents and reduce legal opposition.
3 A static approach
We consider two ﬁrms in the same industry, operating under a single line of patented,
cumulative technology. Firm 1 is an established incumbent, holding an extensive patent
portfolio. Firm 2 is an entrant startup that is capable of developing a promising new
technology by investing an R&D cost C > 0, and thereby, obtaining 1 single-claim patent
as a testimony to its innovativeness. We assume that, due to the cumulative nature of
technology, ﬁrm 2’s patent will be perceived as infringing on one or more of the incum-
bent’s patents. By commercializing the new technology ﬁrm 2 can generate a proﬁt of
V > C. With its greater marketing experience, however, ﬁrm 1 would be able to enlarge
4As Graham and Harhoﬀ (2006) suggest, even the most valuable US patents, those that are inviting
costly litigation in US courts, are not being granted EPO patent protection in about 20% of cases.
6the market value of this technology and generate a total extra proﬁt of V ∗ ≥ V if it
commercializes the technology in place of ﬁrm 2. For this, though, ﬁrm 1 should seek
access to ﬁrm 2’ technology either through court or by a technology sharing agreement.
If ﬁrm 1 ﬁles a suit alleging that 2’s technology is infringing on its patents, the out-
come of the suit is uncertain. Following Choi (1998), we capture this uncertainty by the
probability p with which 1 wins the case. We also interpret a higher p as reﬂecting a
stronger stance of the court toward IP protection. If 2’s technology is found as trespass-
ing on the technological territory of ﬁrm 1, it can only follow that the patent granted on
2’s technology must be invalid, that is, within its single claim it did not put forth a new
idea that, in the court’s view, is diversiﬁed enough from the existing subject matter as
to deliver a non-infringing technology. In this case, considering the high cost of patent
litigation and the lack of a ﬁnal product, ﬁrm 2 can only exit the market. If the court
ﬁnds 2’s technology non-infringing, on the other hand, ﬁrm 2 commercializes it and reaps
a proﬁt of V .5
Contrary to property law, where barriers between properties are well deﬁned, there is
uncertainty over barriers between ideas. As a result, aspects of the startup’s infringing
idea can be re-bundled by more experienced parties in a patent whose aspects may be
deemed as valid and non-infringing by a later court hearing. In this case, when 1 wins it
allows aspects of the infringing idea to ﬁnd uses by potential rivals, lowering the actual
value of the idea to ﬁrm 1 down to bV ∗, b ∈ (0,1). The notion that an invalid patent can
lead rivals to freely appropriate aspects of the idea is similar to Farrell and Shapiro (2006),
who suggest that invalid patents can be used by rivals due to a US court precedent.6 7
Instead of litigation, ﬁrm 1 may also consider to negotiate a technology sharing agree-
ment with 2 (i.e. a takeover deal, or a licensing/cross-licensing agreement). In line with
Crampes and Langinier (2002), we model this process as a Nash bargaining one, where
the disagreement/threat points are the expected surpluses when ﬁrm 1 ﬁles an infringe-
ment lawsuit. Our aim is to ﬁnd the bargaining surplus of each ﬁrm when they decide
5In our model the usual counter accusation of invalidity is not modeled because, contrary to an
individual patent, it is next to impossible to invalidate a patent portfolio consisting of many patents.
6Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
7In the real world of multi claim patents a verdict of infringement can compromise the validity of many
claims. Since frequently startups cannot survive a lost litigation battle they exit the market. In this case
patent trolls usually pick up their patents. Depending on their strategies these patents can be licensed.
However, due to a court precedent (see the previous footnote) all invalid claims and the methods leading
to these may be freely appropriated by rivals.
7on a technology sharing agreement, and to examine how IP protection aﬀects innovation
incentives via its impact on the bargaining outcome.
An option that we do not consider further is a preliminary injunction, which, as
Lemley and Shapiro (2006) note, enhances the plaintiﬀ’s negotiating power. Here such
an enhancement can be delivered via a greater p. Since p and its determinants (both in
this and in the following sections) constitute the main exogenous variables of our model,
preliminary injunctions can be captured by increases in IP protection that broaden the
plaintiﬀ’s negotiating power. Moreover, to simplify the argument, we operate under the
assumptions that: a) litigation cost is zero, and b) justice is swift. Assumption b) is not
unsubstantiated, as the overwhelming majority of IP related cases are settled swiftly out
of court. The swiftness of a ﬁnal ruling (either in or out of court) allows the model to
abstain from elaborating on the damages that the losing party needs to pay.8
To summarize, the order of moves is as follows. First, ﬁrm 2 decides whether to
innovate by investing C or not. If 2 does not innovate, the game is over with zero payoﬀs
to both ﬁrms. If 2 innovates, 1 decides whether to ﬁle a suit or pursue a technology-sharing
agreement a la Nash bargaining. If a suit is ﬁled, with probability p ﬁrm 1 wins and gets
a surplus of bV ∗; and with probability 1 − p ﬁrm 2 wins and gets a surplus of V . The
losing party has a surplus of 0. If an agreement is pursued, the Nash bargaining outcome
results over the total surplus of V ∗. The structure of the game is common knowledge.
The equilibrium of this model follows from the Nash bargaining outcome as explained
below. Speciﬁcally, the disagreement/threat points of ﬁrms 1 and 2 are, d1 = pbV ∗ and
d2 = (1 − p)V . Since V ∗ is the maximum value of the technology, the Nash bargaining
set is deﬁned as B = {(s1,s2) ∈ ￿2
+| s1+s2 ≤ V ∗} where si denotes the bargaining share
of ﬁrm i = 1,2 (the bar above si is derogatory of the static framework). Given that B
is compact and convex, there is a unique Nash bargaining outcome (s1,s2) that solves
max(s1,s2)∈B(s1−d1)(s2−d2), expressed as the following functions of p where r = V/V ∗ ∈
[0,1]:
s1(p) =
V ∗ + d1 − d2
2
=





V ∗ − d1 + d2
2
=




8The yardstick used by courts in deriving damages is either the accumulated royalties resulting from
a hypothetical licensing agreement (this is usually a per-period payment of 1-2% of the product’s value),
or the foregone proﬁts from the sale of the infringing good. Both of these are minimal if justice is swift.
Speciﬁcally, since a ﬁnal product is yet to be developed there are no foregone proﬁts, plus any foregone
royalty payments cannot be central to the paper’s argument because they have yet to accumulate.
8Note that s1(p) > pbV ∗ and s2(p) > (1−p)V hold if 1−r > p(b−r), which is indeed
the case as b,p < 1. Hence, both ﬁrms would ﬁnd it optimal to pursue a technology
sharing agreement a la Nash bargaining, instead of litigation, once an innovation took
place. Anticipating such an agreement, a startup would invest in R&D iﬀ s2(p) ≥ C.
The next proposition summarizes the ﬁndings in the static approach. Noting that the
ownership of the patent per se does not alter the maximum value of the technology V ∗,
the bargaining agreement need not take the form of a takeover, as it can equally well be
attributed to licensing/cross-licensing.
Proposition 1: In the static model, the Nash bargaining over a startup’s innovation
splits the total surplus V ∗ into s1(p) for the incumbent and s2(p) for the startup, as
expressed in (1)-(2). Hence, a startup invests in R&D if and only if s2(p) ≥ C. Stronger
IP protection, i.e., a higher p, therefore, decreases (increases) the share of the startup
(incumbent) via weakening (strengthening) its bargaining position, reducing the startup’s
innovation incentives.
4 A dynamic approach
In this section we elaborate on the issues arising from the cumulative nature of technology
by extending the model to inﬁnite periods. In each period a new startup ﬁrm (ﬁrm
2) enters the market with an idea that can be developed into an innovation, described
through one single-claim patent, if the startup invests C > 0 on R&D.9 However, due to
the cumulative nature of technology, 2’s patent is perceived as infringing one or more of
the incumbent’s patents. The value of the new technology is V > C when commercialized
by the startup, while if the incumbent (ﬁrm 1), who is long-lived, commercializes the
technology its value becomes V ∗ ≥ V . To avoid the replacement eﬀect, as in Bessen and
Maskin (2007), we assume these values as incremental. We stress here that, as will be
illustrated in Section 5, our results are not driven by the disparity between V ∗ and V but
rather by the additional bargaining power that expanding patent portfolios allow for.
If the incumbent acquires new patents through takeover deals, the technological ter-
ritory covered by its patent portfolio expands and thus, as argued in the Introduction,
the likelihood increases that it will prevail in patent-infringement suits. In this regard,
we assume that legal power increases as the portfolio size gets bigger, but at a decreasing
9Our results extend straightforwardly to the cases that investing C leads to an innovation with a
known probability less than (rather than equal to) 1.
9rate. That it increases at a decreasing rate is attested by Bessen and Meurer (2005) who
observe decreasing returns to scale between the size of a software ﬁrm’s patent portfo-
lio and the probability of winning a patent litigation suit. Moreover, it is also a logical
consequence of the fact that the chance of prevailing in court is bounded above by 1.
To capture this we re-deﬁne p, the probability of ﬁrm 1 winning an infringement suit,
as a function of the degree of IP protection, denoted by z > 0, and the size of 1’s portfolio,
measured by the number of patents in ﬁrm 1’s portfolio. Speciﬁcally, through z (which can
be considered as patent breadth) we focus on the court’s attitude towards infringement,
where an increase in z implies a tougher stance on infringement, increasing p.
At this point, to facilitate presentation, we make two indexing conventions. First,
since the continuation game is fully described by the size of 1’s portfolio at the beginning
of that period, with slight abuse of terminology we index the period by the size of 1’s
portfolio. Second, since what matters in the analysis is the accumulation of patents on
top of the incumbent’s initial portfolio, we index the size of the initial portfolio as the
base size of 1, and each patent added to it increases the portfolio size by one. Hence,
period 1 designates the initial period (of portfolio of size 1) and period t > 1 designates
any period prior to which ﬁrm 1’s portfolio size has reached t but no higher, i.e., ﬁrm 1
has added t − 1 patents to its initial portfolio. So long as ﬁrm 1 has added one patent
every period from the initial period, our indexing coincides with the natural indexing of
periods by natural numbers. Two consecutive periods are indexed the same, however,
if the incumbent’s portfolio did not grow in the ﬁrst of the two periods. Thus, p is a
function of z and t, which we denote as pz (t). As discussed earlier, we assume that
∂p/∂z > 0, ∂p/∂t > 0, and ∂
2p/∂t
2 < 0.
Our core argument starts with the observation that the beneﬁts of a takeover venture
beyond current bargaining for ﬁrm 1, as the added bargaining power (caused by the
expansion of 1’s portfolio) may mean better future deals. This suggests that the total
surplus to bargain over can be larger than in the static model. Consequently, ﬁrm 2 may
rationally anticipate a larger bargaining share (compared to the static model), suggesting
that dynamic incentives may induce innovations that would not have been possible in a
static setting. This dynamic argument, unlike in the static model, implies that a takeover
may be preferred to licensing because licensing (or cross-licensing) does not allow for the
additional incremental value caused by the expansion in 1’s patent portfolio.
The argument is not yet complete, because as takeover deals go on, i) ﬁrm 2’s bar-
gaining power weakens, and ii) the extra beneﬁts of a takeover that accrues from future
10deals dwindles to zero due to decreasing returns to scale, rendering the total surplus/pie
to bargain over to shrink to V ∗, the size of the pie in the static model. Therefore, restrict-
ing, for example, the argument to innovations that would not materialize in the static
setting (i.e. C > s2(p)), these two eﬀects dictate that at some point ﬁrm 2 abstains from
innovating as it would not recoup C. Such an end period upsets the potential equilibrium.
To see this denote the last period that innovation is supposed to take place in equilibrium
as T. Considering that in period T + 1 ﬁrm 2’s bargaining share, if it innovated, would
not cover C, the absence of future innovation reduces the bargaining surplus down to V ∗
in period T and consequently, ﬁrm 2’s bargaining share would not cover C if it invested
in period T. This implies no innovation in period T and, in addition, backward induction
implies no innovation in all preceding periods, either.
This glitch is an artifact of the assumption that all startups have the same R&D
cost C. We relax this assumption minimally by assuming that in each period there is a
probability η > 0 that the arrived startup has an R&D cost smaller than C, normalized
to 0 for expositional ease, and the realized value of R&D cost is private information but
η is common knowledge. This is in line with Bessen and Maskin (2007) and amounts
to assuming the existence of Silicon Valley startups that, contrasting their high-cost
counterparts, innovate with minimum cost. As such ﬁrms will engage in R&D whenever
they arrive, an innovation comes forth with at least probability η in every future period.
Thus, in the last period T in which ﬁrm 2 would invest in R&D regardless of its R&D
cost, the total surplus to bargain over is larger than V ∗ by at least a certain amount, and
ﬁrm 2 may have an incentive to invest even when it is a high-cost ﬁrm.
To summarize, the order of moves in each period t is as follows. First, ﬁrm 2 arrives
and decides whether to innovate or not contingent on its R&D cost. If 2 does not innovate,
nothing happens until the next period starts. If 2 innovates, 1 decides whether to ﬁle a
suit or pursue a technology-sharing agreement a la Nash bargaining. If a suit is ﬁled, with
probability pz(t) ﬁrm 1 wins and gets a surplus of bV ∗; and with probability 1 − pz(t)
ﬁrm 2 wins and gets a surplus of V . The losing party has a surplus of 0. If an agreement
is pursued, the Nash bargaining outcome results over the total surplus of V ∗, plus, in
case of a takeover, the additional beneﬁts that would accrue to ﬁrm 1 in future deals due
to its enlarged portfolio. We present our main analysis presuming that any technology-
sharing agreement takes the form of a takeover, then explain how the results change when
licensing agreements are allowed. The startup in each period maximizes the expected
surplus of that period, net of innovation cost when relevant. The incumbent maximizes
11the expected present value of the stream of surpluses with a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
Remark: Note that we do not explicitly model the possibility that the startup tries to
build up its own portfolio via takeover deals with future startups. As long as we consider
startups facing an incumbent with a large established portfolio, the value of pursuing this
route would be low because the startup will continue to compete with the incumbent in
the product market as well as in future takeover deals, both of which will reduce the
expected surplus, and consequently, the startup would ﬁnd it optimal to use this option
as a threat to extract the best takeover deal from the incumbent. In so far as this is the
case, our argument remains valid with V interpreted as including this option value.10
We now provide a formal analysis of the dynamic model and characterize the (subgame-
perfect) equilibrium.11 As we will show, there is a unique equilibrium and it largely
exhibits the features elucidated above, namely, that the takeover deal a la Nash bargaining
provides innovation incentives for high-cost startups, during an early stage of innovation
dynamics at least. Such dynamic eﬀects of inducing high-cost innovations would be best
illustrated if a high-cost innovation would never be possible in a static situation. Hence,
we ﬁrst present our analysis in such environments, and then discuss other environments.
Thus, ﬁrst we consider the case that s2(pz(1)) < C, or equivalently,
s2(pz(t)) < C for all t ≥ 1. (3)
where s2(·) is ﬁrm 2’s bargaining share in the static model as deﬁned in (2). Let T denote,
in an arbitrary equilibrium, the last period in which a high-cost startup innovates with a
positive probability, allowing for the possibility that T = 0, i.e., a high-cost startup never
innovates. T is our point of departure in the analysis, and for notational purposes, in the
sequel a hat on top of a variable is derogatory of all t ≤ T periods, and absence of a hat
denotes all t > T periods. Given that T < ∞ exists (indicating that in equilibrium a
high-cost startup would not innovate indeﬁnitely) as is proved in Proposition 3 below, for
t ≥ T + 1, let X(t) denote the value of ﬁrm 1 at the beginning of period t. Then,
X(t) = (1 − η)δX(t) + η(s1(t) + δX(t + 1)) (4)
10Admittedly, occasionally startups become dominant ﬁrms, however, these ﬁrms tend to rise to dom-
inance in newly forming markets (e.g., Google, Genetech), rather than “win” it over from established
incumbents.
11Firm 1 decides to litigate or bargain without knowing the R&D cost of ﬁrm 2, so technically speaking
the subgame-perfectness does not require rationality of the incumbent’s decision. However, the R&D cost
of the startup is sunk at this point, so it does not aﬀect the continuation game. Hence, in the spirit of
subgame-perfectness, we require that each choice of the incumbent be optimal in the continuation game.
12because, a) if a high-cost ﬁrm arrives with probability 1 − η, there is no innovation and
ﬁrm 1’s value in the next period is the same as that in the current period (i.e. X(t)) and,
b) if a low-cost ﬁrm arrives with probability η, ﬁrm 1 captures the bargaining surplus
over the current innovation, s1(t), plus its value in the next period which is X(t + 1).
Focusing on equation (4), when t > T the total surplus that a startup’s innovation
generates is maximized when ﬁrm 1 commercializes it, adding it to its portfolio. The
total surplus it brings forth in this case is V ∗ + δ(X(t + 1) − X(t)), which is the size of
the pie on the bargaining table. If the case is litigated, since both parties must accept
the court’s decision, there is no takeover deal. Therefore, the threat points are the court
outcomes, d1 = pz(t)bV ∗ and d2 = (1 − pz(t))V . Since the Nash bargaining set in this
case is B(t) = {(s1,s2) ∈ ￿2
+ | s1 + s2 ≤ V ∗ + δ(X(t + 1) − X(t))}, the Nash bargaining
outcome (s1,s2) that solves max(s1,s2)∈B(t)(s1 − d1)(s2 − d2) is calculated as,
s1(t) =












δ(X(t + 1) − X(t))
2
(6)
where r = V/V ∗ ∈ [0,1]. Plugging s1(t) back into equation (4) and rearranging, we get








a diﬀerence equation that characterizes the sequence X(t) for t > T. Since the value of
additional patent diminishes to 0 as t → ∞, it turns out that this sequence increases
and converges, as formalized in the next result. Although X(t) is pertinent for t > T, it
proves useful to treat it as a function deﬁned for all natural numbers t ≥ 1.
Proposition 2: The sequence {X(t)} deﬁned by (7) is unique, monotonically in-
creases at a decreasing rate, i.e., X(t)−X(t−1) > X(t+1)−X(t) > 0 for all t > 1, and
converges to
X(∞) =
1 − r + pz(∞)(b + r)
2(1 − δ)
V
∗η as t → ∞. (8)
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3: If (3) holds, in any equilibrium there exists T < ∞ such that a
high-cost startup does not innovate in any period t > T.
Proof: See Appendix.
13Let ˆ X(t) denote ﬁrm 1’s value at the beginning of period t for t ≤ T. Presuming that
a high-cost startup innovates for sure in period T, ﬁrm 1’s value at the beginning of T is
ˆ X(T) = ˆ s1(T) + δX(T + 1) (9)
where ˆ s1(T) denotes the bargaining share that it derives over the current innovation.
Given that the total surplus to bargain over is V ∗ + δ(X(T + 1) − ˆ X(T)) and the threat
points are d1 = pz(T)bV ∗ and d2 = (1 − pz(T))V in period T, we calculate the Nash
bargaining outcome (ˆ s1(T),ˆ s2(T)) as
ˆ s1(T) =












δ(X(T + 1) − ˆ X(T))
2
. (11)










X(T + 1) +






Furthermore, rearranging equation (7) we get
X(T) =
￿







X(T + 1) +






Since 1 − δ +
3δη
2 > (1 − δ)η +
3δη
2 = (1 + δ
2)η, it follows from (12) and (13) that
ˆ X(T) > X(T), hence ˆ s2(T) < s2(T). If ˆ s2(T) ≥ C, then a high-cost startup would
innovate in period T as presumed. But, it is also possible that ˆ s2(T) < C < s2(T), in
which case a high-cost startup would not innovate in period T. This problem is resolved
when mixed strategies are considered: if a high-cost startup invests with an appropriate
probability, ˆ X(T) gets reduced, pushing up ˆ s2(T) to a level equal to C so that the startup
is indiﬀerent between investing and not. Speciﬁcally, if ˆ s2(T) < C < s2(T) we redeﬁne
ˆ X(T) and ˆ s1(T) as ˆ X(T,a) and ˆ s1(T,a) that solve
ˆ X(T,a) = (η + a)(ˆ s1(T,a) + δX(T + 1)) + (1 − η − a)δ ˆ X(T,a), (14)
ˆ s1(T,a) =












δ(X(T + 1) − ˆ X(T,a))
2
, (16)

















14As a increases from 0 to 1 − η, ˆ X(T,a) increases from X(T) of equation (13) to ˆ X(T) of
equation (12). Analogously, ˆ s2(T,a) decreases from s2(T) to ˆ s2(T). Since ˆ s2(T) < C <
s2(T), it follows that there exists a unique value of a ∈ (0,1 − η), denoted by ˆ a(T), such
that ˆ s2(T,ˆ a(T)) = C. Thus, if a high-cost startup were to invest C with probability
ˆ a(T)
1−η
in period T, its bargaining share would be ˆ s2(T,ˆ a(T)) = C, ensuring that a high-cost
startup is indiﬀerent between innovating and not and thus, justifying the mixed strategy.
We have speciﬁed above the unique equilibrium behavior in period T, according to
which a high-cost startup innovates with a positive probability. This, however, does not
imply that an innovation takes place for sure in all preceding periods t < T, so we need
to apply analogous reasoning to periods T −1, T −2, and so on, and recursively ﬁnd the
equilibrium strategies. The process being analogous, we explain it only for T − 1.
For expositional ease, let ˆ a(T) = 1 − η and ˆ X(T,1 − η) = ˆ X(T) if ˆ s2(T) ≥ C.
Presuming ˆ s2(T − 1) ≥ C, we have the following equilibrium conditions:
ˆ X(T − 1) = ˆ s1(T − 1) + δ ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)),
ˆ s1(T − 1) =




δ( ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) − ˆ X(T − 1))
2
,
ˆ s2(T − 1) =




δ( ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) − ˆ X(T − 1))
2
. (18)
Solving the ﬁrst two equations simultaneously, we get









ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) +






From equation (19) and equation (13) evaluated at T − 1, we deduce that ˆ X(T − 1) >
X(T − 1), which implies that ˆ s2(T − 1) < s2(T − 1) because ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) > X(T) and
(1 + δ
2)−1 > (1 − δ +
3δη
2 )−1η. Hence ˆ s2(T − 1) < C < s2(T − 1) may still hold, in which
case we solve, analogously to before, the simultaneous equations,
ˆ X(T − 1,a) = (η + a)(ˆ s1(T − 1,a) + δ ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T))) + (1 − η − a)δ ˆ X(T − 1,a), (20)
ˆ s1(T − 1,a) =




δ( ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) − ˆ X(T − 1,a))
2
, (21)
ˆ s2(T − 1,a) =




δ( ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) − ˆ X(T − 1,a))
2
= C,(22)





















2 < 1 and ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) > X(T), this implies that ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) −
ˆ X(T − 1,0) > X(T) − X(T − 1), and consequently, ˆ s2(T − 1,0) > s2(T − 1) > C. Since
15ˆ X(T − 1,a) increases in a, lowering ˆ s2(T − 1,a) to a level below C at a = 1 − η as
presumed above, there is a unique value of a ∈ (0,1 −η), denoted by ˆ a(T −1), such that
ˆ s2(T −1,a) = C. Thus, we have derived a unique equilibrium probability,
ˆ a(T−1)
1−η ∈ (0,1),
of innovating during period T − 1 and the corresponding equilibrium value of ﬁrm 1,
ˆ X(T − 1,ˆ a(T − 1)). It is straightforward to verify that an analogous recursive process
uniquely determines the equilibrium strategy in each period all the way back to t = 1.
This completes characterization of the unique equilibrium for the cases that satisfy (3).
We now discuss the alternative case that ¯ s2(pz(1)) ≥ C. There are two subcases
to consider, namely, ¯ s2(pz(∞)) < C and ¯ s2(pz(∞)) ≥ C. When ¯ s2(pz(∞)) < C it
is straightforward to see that there exists a unique equilibrium analogous to the one
characterized above. Speciﬁcally, high-cost startups innovate for sure in all periods t such
that ¯ s2(pz(t)) ≥ C, because ˆ X(t) increases in t and consequently,
ˆ s2(t) = ¯ s2(pz(t)) +
δ( ˆ X(t + 1) − ˆ X(t))
2
> C. (23)
Then, since the increase in ˆ X(t) slows down and, for some t, ¯ s2(pz(t)) will eventually dip
bellow C, high-cost startups stop innovating from a certain period. If ¯ s2(pz(∞)) ≥ C, on
the other hand, a high-cost startup innovates in every period in the unique equilibrium of
the dynamic model because ˆ s2(t) > ¯ s2(pz(t)) as per (23) and ¯ s2(pz(t)) > ¯ s2(pz(∞)). Now
we can characterize the unique equilibrium of the dynamic model in the next theorem.
Theorem 4: The dynamic model has a unique equilibrium. If ¯ s2(pz(∞)) ≥ C, in
this equilibrium a startup innovates for sure in every period regardless of its R&D cost;
If ¯ s2(pz(∞)) < C, on the other hand, there is a critical period 0 ≤ T < ∞ such that a
high-cost startup innovates with a positive probability in every period t ≤ T but not in
periods t > T, while a low-cost startup innovates for sure in every period. In either case,
when there is an innovation the innovator reaches a takeover deal with the incumbent.
An interesting policy-relevant question is what is the optimal level of IP protection,
z, that provides the innovation incentives for startups for longest. Although an algebraic
answer is hard to obtain due to the recursive nature of the solution and the discontinuity at
t = T, our simulation results (summarized in Section 5) conﬁrm the following intuition: If
z is excessive, the marginal protective power that an extra patent brings to the incumbent
is large initially but quickly dwindles as a result of accumulating its power too rapidly,
killing oﬀ the positive eﬀect on startup innovation prematurely. If z is ﬂimsy, on the other
hand, the marginal protective power of an extra patent is small and its impact on the
16startup’s innovation incentives is limited. Consequently, the optimal level of IP protection
tends to be at a moderate level.
We have carried out our analysis presuming that any technology-sharing agreement is
restricted to a takeover deal, i.e., licensing was not considered. Since licensing (lacking the
added advantages accruing to ﬁrm 1 from future dealings) fails to increase the innovation’s
total value beyond V ∗, one can see that the Nash bargaining outcome of a licensing deal
is the same as the static model’s bargaining outcome, ¯ s1(pz(t)) and ¯ s2(pz(t)). Thus, if
¯ s2(pz(1)) < C licensing in any period t would not cover C for the startup, allowing only
low-cost innovations, while if ¯ s2(pz(∞)) ≥ C it would allow high-cost innovations in every
period t. In either case, reaching a takeover deal instead of licensing would not aﬀect the
startups’ innovation decisions. However, with takeover deals ﬁrm 1 anticipates a larger
surplus due to its enhanced future bargaining positions and, furthermore, a part of this
extra surplus accrues to the current startup ﬁrm (at the expense of the startups in future
deals). Therefore, the equilibrium outcome does not change even if licensing is allowed.
If ¯ s2(pz(1)) ≥ C > ¯ s2(pz(∞)), on the other hand, there is room for licensing. For
example, after expanding its portfolio size via takeovers to the size T, the incumbent
may obtain access to new technology through licensing in all subsequent periods, so that
startups innovate forever regardless of their R&D cost. Relative to when licensing is disal-
lowed, this would bring about more innovations but the bargaining share of the incumbent
could be smaller for the periods in which licensing deals will be reached. Foreseeing this,
once the portfolio grows to size T the incumbent may want to selectively release some
of the patents in its portfolio to avoid discouraging startup innovations by becoming too
powerful a potential plaintiﬀ. This practise is reminiscent of the recent trend of patent
donations: in the last few years ﬁrms such as DuPont, Lubrizol, Eastman Chemicals,
and General Motors have given away patents with an estimated value of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. An alternative interpretation of this practice (given that, in this context,
patents last a ﬁxed number of years and every period a patent is added to the incumbent’s
portfolio) is to treat T as the optimal patent length, constraining the portfolio size to T,
allowing for the arrival of high-cost innovations ad inﬁnitum.
5 Simulation and comparative statics
In light of the diminishing marginal protective power of patents underlying our theoretical
results, prior to the simulation we need to address how pz(t) changes with t and z. Em-
17pirical estimates of the marginal protective ability of patents are scarce and inconclusive.
Lanjoun and Schankerman (2004), who look at how patent portfolios help reduce a ﬁrm’s
probability of facing litigation, are one of the few that examine how patent portfolios af-
fect litigation. They ﬁnd the marginal protective power to be positive but slowing down.
We capture this through pz(t) = 1 − (1 − z)t. To provide an example (in line with the
magnitudes of z we ﬁnd), when z = .007 a ﬁrm with a portfolio made up of 100 patents
stands a 50% chance of winning its case, and an increase of 1 patent raises this by .34%.
Normalizing V ∗ = 1, we argue our case for r = 1, b = .5 and C = 1.0001. An r = 1
allows for results that are not driven by the disparity between V and V ∗, and b < 1 means
that takeover deals will be pursued over litigation. Additionally, since s2(p) ≤ s2(0) = 1,
by choosing C > 1 we ensure that a) innovation by high-cost startups may only be possible
in a dynamic model, and b) that IP protection is necessary for such innovation because
pz(t) is constant at 0 for all t if z = 0, erasing any dynamic eﬀect. In terms of δ and η,
we initially simulate the model for δ = .97 and η = .2 and then for δ = .99 and η = .8.
Concentrating on the t > T periods, for given z, we simulate the unique sequence
{X(t)} deﬁned by (7), which converges to (8). From this sequence, through equation (6),
is derived a convergent sequence s2(t), as illustrated in Figure 3 for z = .007. Then, the
period T is obtained by identifying the last period for which s2(t) ≥ C.
To examine how z aﬀects T, we ﬁnd the values of T for z’s between .0001 and .01 in
20 steps of .0005. Figure 4 shows how T changes as z increases when δ = .97 and η = .2
(the lower graph) and when δ = .99 and η = .8 (the upper graph).
Both graphs are quasiconcave, in particular, T initially increases with z, then decreases
as z increases further. Speciﬁcally, if z is high then X(t) converges quickly, driving the
future beneﬁts from an extra takeover to nil and thus, halting the positive eﬀect on startup
innovation prematurely. For small z’s, on the other hand, an extra patent increases pz(t)
and X(t) only marginally, failing to suﬃciently increase s2(t) as to allow for a high T.
Needless to say, the precise relationship between z and T changes as other details of the
speciﬁcation change. However, the quasiconcavity with an interior peak prevails in all
our simulations so long as s2(0) < C and high-cost innovation is possible at all, as partly
demonstrated in Figure 4 explained below. Furthermore, in our analysis both ﬁrms are
assumed to have equal bargaining power, however, endowing diﬀerent bargaining power
would lead to diﬀerent levels of T. Lowering C would also lead to a higher T.
Turning our attention to t ≤ T, for δ = .97, η = .2 (and for the same z’s used above)
we employ equations (11)-(12) to derive ˆ X(T) and ˆ s2(T). If ˆ s2(T) is less than C, using
18mixed strategies, we ﬁnd ˆ a(T) by equating (16) to C, and derive ˆ X(T,ˆ a(T)) from equation
(17). The equilibrium strategies for the remaining periods until t = 1 can be recursively
derived as follows: For T −1 we use equations (18)-(19) to derive ˆ s2(T −1) and ˆ X(T −1).
If ˆ s2(T − 1) < C, using mixed strategies, we ﬁnd the value of ˆ a(T − 1) by equating (22)
to C. Using the same routine we derive the equilibrium value of ˆ a(t) for each t ≤ T, as
reported in Figure 5 for each of the 20 diﬀerent values of z. Due to the discreteness, a
range of z provides the highest T as shown in Figure 5. Among these values of z, those
with higher values of ˆ a(t) induce more startup innovation on average in each period t ≤ T.
In Figure 5, the middle values in the range of z for the highest T tend to have higher
values of ˆ a(t) although no single value of z is pinned down as having the highest ˆ a(t) for
all t ≤ T.
Finally, we report some comparative statics results by examining how b, η, and δ aﬀect
the graphs in Figure 4.12 Starting with b, Figure 6 plots the graphs as we vary b from .1
to 1 in 10 steps (changing z as before), which indicate that increase in b does not aﬀect
T but it increases the range of z’s for which T is highest. Next, Figure 7 plots the graphs
as δ increase from .9 to .99 in 10 steps, which indicate that T increase as δ increases.
Lastly, Figure 8 plots the graphs as η varies from .1 to 1 in 10 steps, which indicate that
T increases (at a decreasing rate) as η increases.
6 Conclusions
In the 1990’s a vibrant literature analyzed the rate of IP protection (in terms of patent
breadth vs. length) that minimizes the eﬀects of the monopoly that patents imply while
oﬀering suﬃcient R&D incentives. In this paper we depart from this tradition focusing
instead on the dynamic eﬀect of IP protection on startup innovation. We argue that
positive but not excessive IP protection may foster takeover agreements between the
incumbent and startup innovator, the prospect of which motivates the startup’s entre-
preneurial activity in the ﬁrst place. Since the beneﬁts of a takeover venture beyond the
current invention via strengthened bargaining position in future takeover deals due to
an enlarge patent portfolio, innovation activities may be less active when only licensing
agreements are allowed or when there is no IP protection. On the other hand, excessive
12We do not change r as any decrease in r reduces s2(t) below C for all t, dictating a need to change
C as well, in which case comparisons are void. Nonetheless, for r = 1/3, V ∗ = 1.5 and C = 1.0001 we
derive a graph almost identical to the one we ﬁnd when we use, δ = .97, η = .2 and b = .5.
19IP protection accumulates the incumbent’s bargaining power too quickly and kills oﬀ the
startup’s innovation activities prematurely. We demonstrate this intuition by simulation
results that exhibit an inverse U-shape relationship between the number of sustainable
innovations and the level of IP protection.
Our theory can help explain the increase in takeovers we have witnessed since the
1980’s, an increase that coincides with a major shift in US patent policy, namely, the
formation of a single patent’s court, in place of many appellate courts with diverging
attitudes towards infringement. Such a legal apparatus is absent from the EU, where
questions of enforcement, validity and revocation are dealt with by national courts that
have varying attitudes towards infringement. The EU Commission has been advocating
the creation of a central patent dispute court, in the hope of simplifying the IP framework
in the EU. Our analysis supports this initiative suggesting that, provided the court keeps
a balanced approach, it can spur innovation activities by startup entrepreneurs.
We have labored under the assumption that there is only one ﬁrm interested in the
startup. The struggle between Microsoft and Google for a share of Facebook suggests that
this is not always the case. How the bargaining will get resolved between a startup and
competing incumbents is unclear, because (setting aside competition law issues) there is
a variety of diﬀerent strategies that the competitors may follow, which venture beyond
the scope of this paper. Subsequently, we set aside such a question for further research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: First, note that X(t) is bounded below (by 0) and above
because maximum surplus in each period is bounded and δ < 1. If X(t + 1) ≤ X(t),
then the right hand side of equation (7) would be non-positive and, furthermore, its
value would strictly decrease when evaluated for t + 1 because X(t + 1) ≤ X(t) and
pz(t + 1) > pz(t). This would mean that X(t + 2) − X(t + 1) < X(t + 1) − X(t) ≤ 0.
Applying the same argument repeatedly, we deduce that if X(t + 1) ≤ X(t) then the
sequence should decrease forever at an increasing rate after t, which is a contradiction
because the sequence is bounded below. Hence, we conclude that X(t+1)−X(t) > 0 for
all t. Since the sequence is bounded above, it further follows that it must converge. The
limit value, X(∞) in (8), is obtained by setting X(t + 1) = X(t) and pz(t) = pz(∞) in
equation (7) and solving for X(t).
To show uniqueness, suppose to the contrary that there are two sequences, {X(t)}
20and {X￿(t)}, that satisfy (7), such that X￿(t￿) = X(t￿) +γ for some γ > 0 and t￿. By (7),
we have X￿(t￿ +1) = X(t￿ +1)+(1+
2(1−δ)
δη )γ > X(t￿ +1)+γ and by repeating the same
calculation, X￿(t) > X(t) + γ for all t ≥ t￿. This is impossible because both sequences
should converge to the same limit as proved above, proving the uniqueness.










If X(t+1) −X(t) ≥ X(t)− X(t− 1) for some t, it would follow from equation (24) that
X(t+2)−X(t+1) ≥ X(t+1)−X(t) because 0 < pz(t+1)−pz(t) < pz(t)−pz(t−1) due
to the assumption that ∂2p/∂t2 < 0. Furthermore, X(t+1)−X(t) would increase in t by
repeated application of the same argument. This is impossible because the sequence X(t)
converges as shown above, hence we conclude that X(t) − X(t − 1) > X(t + 1) − X(t).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: To reach a contradiction, suppose to the contrary that in an
equilibrium there is an arbitrarily large t such that a high-cost startup innovates with a
positive probability in period t. Note that a takeover deal will be reached if an innovation
takes place in period t, for otherwise a high-cost startup would not innovate because
d2 = (1 − pz(t))V < s2(pz(t)) < C. Let ˆ Xt denote ﬁrm 1’s value at the beginning
of period t, and let αt denote the probability that an innovation takes place in period t.
Since a low-cost startup always innovates, αt = η+(1−η)at ≥ η where at is the probability
that a high-cost startup innovates in period t. Then, ˆ Xt = αt(ˆ s1t + δ ˆ Xt+1) + (1 − αt)δ ˆ Xt
where ˆ s1t =
1+pz(t)(b+r)−r
2 V ∗ +
δ( ˆ Xt+1− ˆ Xt)
2 , so that
ˆ Xt =
αt




δ ˆ Xt+1 + ¯ s1(pz(t))
￿
. (25)
If ˆ Xt ≥ ˆ Xt+1, ﬁrm 2’s bargaining share in period t, ˆ s2t = ¯ s2(pz(t)) +
δ( ˆ Xt+1− ˆ Xt)
2 , is
less than C because ¯ s2(pz(t)) < C by (3), and consequently, αt = η. Since αt+1 ≥ η and
pz(t + 1) ≥ pz(t), therefore, ˆ Xt ≥ ˆ Xt+1 < ˆ Xt+2 would imply
αt












δ ˆ Xt+2 + ¯ s1(pz(t + 1))
￿
,
contradicting the presumption that ˆ Xt ≥ ˆ Xt+1 according to (25). Hence, we deduce
that if ˆ Xt ≥ ˆ Xt+1 then αt = η and ˆ Xt+1 ≥ ˆ Xt+2, and by repeatedly applying the same
logic, αt￿ = η for all t￿ > t. Since this contradicts to the supposed equilibrium, we
conclude that ˆ Xt < ˆ Xt+1 for all t. Since ﬁrm 1’s value is bounded above, it further
21follows that ˆ Xt+1 − ˆ Xt → 0 as t → ∞, which in turn implies that ˆ s2t → ¯ s2(pz(∞)) as
t → ∞, contradicting the presumption that a high-cost startup innovates with a positive
probability indeﬁnitely. Q.E.D.
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